This study contrasts the rationalist and psychologist approaches to information failure as the cause of crisis escalation and war. Building on the psychological insights on misperception, it presents a simple game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining, where signals are subject to perceptual errors and thereby multiple interpretations.
Uncertainty and information play fundamental roles in international politics. Two influential approaches point to information failure as the primary cause of crisis escalation and the outbreak of war. The rationalist approach claims that war can occur when some political and military information crucial to crisis bargaining is privately known and states have incentives to misrepresent their private information. The psychological approach contends that war can result when erroneous perception or misperception of some critical factors, caused by some psychological biases and cognitive limitations, distorts beliefs and actions of states in a crisis.
The two approaches have developed in isolation from each other. This isolation, to some extent, shaped the "rational deterrence debate" in the 1980s, when deterrence theorists of rational and psychological traditions debated the relative merit of the two approaches in explaining decision-making during international crises (e.g., Achen and Snidal 1989; George and Smoke 1989; Jervis 1989; Lebow and Stein 1989; McGinnis 1992; Wagner 1992) . As Downs (1989) observes, the debate centered on a disagreement between the deductive methods of microeconomics versus the inductive methods of psychology, rather than the insights that each side had to offer. Mercer (2005) also notes that "the key difference between rationalists and psychologists is not over what they explain, but over how they explain."
Despite the significant developments that each approach has achieved since the debate, the apparent contention between the two still remains unchanged.
1 Emphasis on the methodological disagreements obscures the real difference in the nature of the informational problem that each approach ascribes as the cause of crisis escalation and deterrence failure. Each approach restricts its analytical attention to a limited aspect of the information problem in international crises. For example, rationalist models of crisis bargaining and deterrence formulate uncertainty as private information about preferences (due to Harsanyi 1967) , while authors on misperception formulate uncertainty as noise or instability in the receiver's perception of signals (c.f., Jervis 1976) . Although both types of uncertainty are certainly important in international crises, how we define uncertainty inevitably determines the type of problem that we can address. The rationalists, therefore, define the key strategic problem as the sender's misrepresentation incentives and the credibility of signals, while the psychologists find the key issue to be the receiver's psychological pathologies of misperception (see also Fearon 1992, 96 ). Yet, no single analytical model accounts for every variation of uncertainty (Iida 1993) .
In this article, I demonstrate that many important aspects of the rationalist and psychological approaches can be seen as complementary to each other.
To do so, I analyze a game-theoretic model of signaling that incorporates the insights offered by psychological accounts on misperception. The analysis shows that both approaches can benefit from incorporating insights from each other and that the gulf separating these two approaches need not be exaggerated. As demonstrated in other subfields in the social sciences, bringing rationalist and psychological approaches within a single analytic framework may improve our understanding of informational failure as a cause of war.
2 Before presenting a model of signaling and perception, I first discuss how and why unifying the two approaches would improve our understanding of the role of uncertainty and information in crises.
Signaling and Perception: Two Stories
Although both rationalist and psychological approaches view crises and wars as a product of information failure, the source, type, and strategic consequence of information failure differ between the approaches. As Table 1 shows, the type of uncertainty, or information failure, that the rationalist approach addresses is called strategic uncertainty (Iida 1993; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985 of the receiver of signals that result in the problem of misperception in the form of distorted beliefs and inaccurate inferences.
Since these two approaches focus on different facets of information failure as the cause of crisis escalation, they should be seen as complementary, rather than incompatible.
In fact, a better understanding of information failure as a cause of war requires both approaches; each approach highlights areas of weakness of the other. For one, the psychological insight on misperception brings to light an important, but often implicit, assumption commonly held by rationalist accounts that signals in crises are unequivocal. Thus, the adversaries in a crisis do not disagree on the interpretation of those signals. For example, when a state in a dispute takes an action that does not challenge the status quo ante, the other state should always perceive and interpret this action accordingly. The standard rationalist approach does not allow for this action to be perceived as a challenge to the status quo. In other words, rationalists commonly assume that the meaning of a signal is common knowledge and that actors do not differ in the way they process information (e.g., Bayes' Rule). Lebow 1981) .
Just as the psychological approach can complement rationalist accounts, rationalist models can highlight the weakness of psychological accounts. First, analysts cannot know when and how misperception deviates from accurate perception or to what extent misperception produces deviations from rationality until a baseline is established. Rationalist models can help to establish such a baseline, which is often unclear or implicitly assumed in most of psychological accounts (Kahler 1998) . 4 An adequate theory accounting both for singling and perception must identify the condition under which misperception can cause crisis dynamics that cannot otherwise be observed in the absence of perceptual uncertainty. Second, as Levy (1983) points out, psychological models of deterrence are not built on a theory of why wars occur. 5 Consequently, they commonly neglect consequences of misperception other than war. In particular, the psychological accounts of misperception rarely explain why sometimes signaling helps the states settle disputes short of war;
it is conceivable that misperception yields not only war but also peace. A satisfactory explanation of crisis communication and its consequences, therefore, must simultaneously account for problems involved both in signaling and perception. This study is one such attempt.
My analysis is predominantly rationalist in nature, since I use a common rationalist model of crisis signaling as the analytical baseline, to which I incorporate insights from the psychological literature on misperception. As Downs (1989) suggests, analyzing two kinds of information failure in a coherent framework does not necessarily demand that the two approaches be fully integrated into a single synthetic model. 6 This study will show how and to what extent insights on misperception can be described in a rationalist model and explore logical implications for equilibrium behavior. This exercise results in a rationalist logic of signaling and perception, which links Bayesian learning and incentive problems to the issues of misperception in crisis bargaining.
The psychological approach has identified a variety of "biases" in the way decision makers form beliefs, process incoming information, interpret signals, or act on their beliefs and preferences. "Misperception" is an umbrella term that encompasses various types of "biases," and we can classify types of misperception in terms of where in the decision making process an "error" occurs. For example, social representation theory posits that decision makers can have divergent pre-existing beliefs or worldviews due to their unique experiences (e.g., childhood), and this difference in worldviews can lead to a disagreement over the interpretation of events in crisis bargaining (e.g., Moscovici 1988) . Cognitive dissonance theory posits that an error can occur in processing new information. In particular, decision makers are hesitant to change their prior beliefs if they receive information that is inconsistent with their beliefs; they will seek to resolve the inconsistency by underestimating or ignoring incoming information. Behavioral economists have amassed experimental evidence that decision makers do not process information as specified by Bayes' Rule (e.g.,
Charness and Levin 2005).
The model studied in this article does not encompass such variety in misperception.
Each type of misperception requires a specific modeling approach adequately designed to address the question at hand. My analysis is restricted to errors in the receiver's perception of signals and their consequences in crisis bargaining.
Note that I restrict my analysis to the consequences of misperception in crisis bar-6 It would be counterproductive if the two approaches put aside their differences; yet a "commitment to either approach should not . . . blind us to the benefits of exploring their interrelationships" (Downs 1989, 236) . See McGinnis (1992) for the opposite view: "continued reliance on [game-theoretic] models will widen the gap between rational deterrence theorists and their critics" (p. 443).
gaining. It abstracts away the diverse sources of misperception, lumping them into an exogenous device that randomly determines the accuracy of perception. This is not to suggest that mental or psychological processes are unimportant; my analysis takes as given the psychological literature on the sources of misperception.
The analysis clarifies when and how misperception impedes (or facilitates) signaling and learning in crisis communication and outcome. The analysis also identifies when and how belief formation can be distorted compared to the rationalist baseline, and clarifies when and what kind of misperception matters in crisis.
Modeling Signaling and Perception
I analyze a canonical game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining where signals are subject to perceptual errors so that the sender and receiver strategically respond to the possibility that signals may be inaccurately perceived. This model allows us to explicitly distinguish the role played by private information from the role played by perceptual errors. Probing this model will help us untangle the intricate relationship between problems of misperception and problems of strategic misrepresentation.
The key innovation of this modeling approach is to allow sequentially rational players to make a mistake in perceiving signals, which may result in divergent beliefs about the state of the world despite the fact that the states share the same prior beliefs and information-processing system (i.e., Bayes' rule). This modeling approach is consistent with the claim made by some psychologists that beliefs and decisions are rational, however biased and distorted they might be due to misperception, as long as they are consistent with perceived (misperceived) signals (Mercer 2005 ; see also Jervis 1976) . One need not depart from the common rationalist framework to probe "mistakes" induced by misperception.
The Model
Consider a crisis game sketched in Figure 1 . Two states, a challenger (C) and a defender (D), are in a dispute over some good. Since D controls the good in the status quo, he has no incentive to initiate a crisis. Information and Beliefs. The crisis game involves one-sided incomplete informa-7 I use a female pronoun for the challenger, C, and male for the defender, D. 8 See Kurizaki (2007) , Carson (Forthcoming), and Yarhi-Milo (2013) assume the political cost involved in a public concession. See Kurizaki and Whang (2015) for empirical evidence for C's audience costs. I assume that nature determines if D accurately perceives a signal conveyed by C's initial move. D perceives a signal accurately with probability θ ∈ (0, 1), and misperceives it with probability 1 − θ. Neither C nor D can observe nature's move, but the probability distribution of θ is common knowledge. Consequently, if C actually challenges, then D perceives the challenge accurately with probability θ, but D incorrectly perceives no threat with probability 1 − θ. Similarly, when C maintains the status quo, D correctly perceives no threat with probability θ, and incorrectly perceives a threat with probability 1 − θ. This assumption allows rational (i.e., Bayesian) players to make "mistakes" in perceiving signals with positive probability so that they update their beliefs based on misperceived information.
Perceptual errors (or misperception) alter the sequence of moves in crisis bargaining as depicted in Figure 2 .
9 The most significant alternation follows from D's erroneous perception of a threat when it actually does not exist. In the absence of C's challenge, D will erroneously perceive a challenge with probability 1 − θ, and act as if there were a threat, deciding whether to concede (CD 1 ) or resist (RS 1 ).
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(1 -) Figure 2 : Sequence of Moves with Perceptual Errors no challenge, because he knows that this perception can be incorrect with probability 1 − θ, he still decides whether to concede (CD 2 ) or resist (RS 2 ).
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If D concedes, the possession of the disputed good is transferred to C, regardless of whether his threat perception is accurate or not. For making this public concession, D pays audience costs, a D ≥ 0. If D resists (RS 1 ), upon erroneously perceiving a threat, D effectively initiates a crisis and C will respond by either backing down (BD 2 ) or standing firm (SF 2 ). Thus, it is possible that even if the "revisionist" challenger does not initiate a crisis, the "status quo" defender accidently initiates a crisis. If C backs down (BD 2 ) in the absence of actual challenge, she does not incur audience costs since there is no challenge to back down from. This is because in the eyes of the domestic audience, the decision not to fight (BD 2 ) in the absence of initial challenge is indistinguishable from the status quo ante since there is no transfer of the disputed good.
12 If C stands firm 1(2) denotes the case where i sees a threat (no threat).
11 Since the decision either to concede (CD 2 ) or resist (CD 2 ) following a perception of the SQ requires somewhat strong cognitive ability of D, I will relax this assumption in Section 5.
12 Recall that C pays audience costs for backing down if she fails to follow through on her threat to use force. Note that the most significant departure from the baseline crisis game depicted due to perceptual uncertainty is that D gets to decide either to resist (RS 2 ) or concede (CD 2 ) following perceptions of the "status quo." This alternation implies that while D has the limited ability to understand C's signal, he is nonetheless aware of how likely he has misperceived the signal and hence able to take this possibility into his decision-making in crisis bargaining. However, it is also conceivable that D is unaware of the perceptual errors that he has made and hence takes no further actions. Since the choice set available for D following a perception of the SQ is subject to the cognitive capacity required of D, I will relax this assumption in Section 5.
Equilibrium
If θ = 1, there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the crisis game, which pools over C's types or only partially separates among them, depending on the relative values 13 Since incomplete information is not depicted, this figure only partially depicts perceptual uncertainty. 
This condition holds if
The cut-point q * describes D's decision rule for resisting, upon receiving a threat.
Anticipating this decision rule, the irresolute-type has an incentive to exploit D's strategic uncertainty by bluffing since it would be most profitable if D (mistakenly) concedes in a non-credible threat to use force. The extent to which the irresolute-type can optimally mimic the behavior of the resolute type depends on D's prior belief p about C's type.
There are two cases to consider. If the prior is high enough (i.e., if p = q ≥ q * ), the irresolute-type always bluffs. Since both types of C make a challenge, D's posterior belief q remains the same as the prior belief p. Consequently, D will concede with probability one, which ensures that it is incentive compatible for the irresolute type to bluff.
If p ≤ q * , on the other hand, D will always resist if challenged. In this case, C of the irresolute-type has an incentive to deviate from the pooling strategy because it would be forced to back down as its value for war is less than its audience costs (i.e., if
This suggests that the irresolute-type can bluff only probabilistically. Let b denote the probability that the irresolute-type makes a challenge. Then, Bayes' Rule implies that the posterior belief that C is of the resolute-type when receiving a challenge is given by
which must be equal to q
Since the irresolute-type only bluffs occasionally, D will also resist probabilistically, conditional on q. Letting r denote the probability that D resists if challenged, D chooses r so that the irresolute-type is indifferent between bluffing and keeping the status quo: −ra C + (1 − r) = 0. Solving for r yields the equilibrium probability r * that D resists:
The irresolute-type's bluffing rate must be a best response to r * . Since, in equilibrium, C chooses b just large enough to deter D from resisting, b must solve q * = q, which yields.
Because b must be strictly positive, we must have
Similarly, note that b cannot exceed one, which holds if
following propositions summarize this analysis. 
and he resists (RS) with probability r * .
Misperception Equilibrium
We now turn to the case where perceptual errors can occur with probability θ ∈ (0, 1).
The game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which can take one of three forms 14 All the proofs are presented in Appendix.
depending on underlying parameters. Although signals only partially reveal C's type in the rationalist baseline, the introduction of perceptual errors allows for full revelation of C's type as long as her audience costs are sufficiently high. I refer to this equilibrium as the misperception equilibrium.
Before characterizing each of these equilibrium cases, it is useful to present two preliminary results on the equilibrium behavior. First, the resolute-type of C is defined as the type that always prefers standing firm to backing down. However, if D mistakenly perceives a threat when C did not threaten D in the first place, C would not incur audience costs a C since there is no outstanding threat to back down from. In this case, all the type of C prefer backing-down (BD 2 ) to standing firm (SF 2 ). The next lemma summarizes C's dominant strategies. 
Lemma 1. The resolute-type prefers standing firm to backing down if and only if it made a threat (CH). The irresolute-type strictly prefers backing-down
1+a D 1−w D . Likewise, D is optimistic if p ≤ 1+a D 1−w D .
Pooling Equilibrium
I first consider a pooling equilibrium in which both types of C make a challenge with probability one. Despite the introduction of perceptual errors and the resulting changes to the structure of the game, the equilibrium behavior in this pooling case essentially remains unchanged from the rationalist baseline. To see this, note that in this pooling equilibrium D can perceive a threat only if his perception is accurate; D cannot perceive a threat if his perception is biased. If misperception occurs in this equilibrium, the only thing D can observe is the status quo unchallenged. Hence, both types' pooling behavior leaves no room for misperception to impact the way in which signaling and learning occur.
More specifically, there are two states of the world in which D can perceive a threat in this pooling equilibrium:
(1) D correctly perceives a threat, with probability pθ, when the resolute-type makes a threat; and (2) D correctly perceives a threat, with probability (1 − p)θ, when the irresolute-type makes a (non-credible) threat.
Provided that D perceives a threat, D's posterior belief that C will carry out this threat (SF 1 ) if resisted is
Similarly, when perceiving no threat, D's posterior q 2 remains the same as the prior p.
Given D's beliefs and decision-rules (lemma 2), the irresolute-type finds it profitable to bluff with probability one if D's prior belief is sufficiently high (or if p >
. Otherwise, the irresolute-type will have an incentive to deviate from the pooling strategy because the low p implies that D will always resist (RS 1 and RS 2 ), regardless of his perception, and so any bluffs will be caught. 
Proposition 2 (Pooling
Semi-Separating Equilibrium
, some of the irresolute-types cannot afford to bluff. This may separate C's types, allowing for information transmission and hence D's learning about C's type. Let us first consider the semi-separating case where C makes a challenge with probability one if she is the resolute-type and with some probability b if she is the irresolute-type. In this event, there are three states of the world in which D can perceive a threat:
(1) D correctly perceives a (credible) threat, with probability pθ, issued by the resolutetype;
(2) D correctly perceives a threat, with probability (1 − p)bθ, when the irresolute-type bluffs; and (3) D mistakenly perceives a threat, with probability (
the irresolute-type does not challenge the status quo.
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Given these probabilities and C's dominant strategies (lemma1), D's posterior belief that C will stand firm is given by
if D perceives a threat, and
if D perceives no threat.
Given D's beliefs and decision rules in lemma 2, the irresolute-type chooses the bluffing , given the posterior q 2 . This implies that C will choose b so as to induce D indifferent between RS 1 and CD 1 only in response to perceived threats. Hence, sequential rationality implies that the optimal bluffing rate must solve the indifference condition for the case where D perceives a threat:
.
If D perceives a threat, on the other hand, he has an incentive to resist only some of perceived challenges, because some threats are credible and because his threat perception may be inaccurate. If r denotes the probability that D resists, upon perceiving a threat, it must make the irresolute-type indifferent between bluffing and maintaining the status quo in the face of D's possible misperception. Solving this indifference condition for r yields D's equilibrium strategy such that
Since 0 < r * < 1, it follows that this strategy r * is sustained in equilibrium if C's audience costs are sufficiently small so that
Audience costs greater than this upper bound would counteract the irresolute-type's incentive to bluff. 1−b)(1−θ)) upon perceiving a threat, with probability q 2 =
, upon perceiving no threat.
Separating Equilibrium
If C's audience cost is greater than a C , only the resolute type makes a threat and bluffing does not occur along the equilibrium path. Signals therefore fully separate C's types.
There are two cases where D can perceive a threat:
(1) D correctly perceives a threat with probability pθ, which is issued by the resolutetype; and (2) D misperceives a threat with probability (1 − p)(1 − θ), although the irresolute-type did not make a threat.
Given the possibility of D's perceptual errors and C's dominant strategies discussed above, D's posterior beliefs upon perceiving a threat and no threat, are respectively given by
Given D's posterior beliefs and decision rule (lemma 2), it is straightforward to show that, for any θ > 1 2
, D always concedes (CD 1 ), upon perceiving a threat, and resists (RS 2 ), upon perceiving no threat.
Incentive compatibility requires that the irresolute-type prefer SQ to CH. Because the irresolute-type always backs down (BD 1 and BD 2 ) regardless of its initial move by subgame perfection, this condition holds if and only if 
, when perceiving no threat.
A Signaling Logic of Misperception and War
The misperception equilibrium describes general ways in which misperception can arise and interfere with the processes of signaling and Bayesian learning in crisis bargaining. It helps us probe a rationalist logic of misperception, for it ties problems of misperception to the game-theoretic logic of private information and incentives to misrepresent it. In this section, I discuss behavioral consequences of misperception from several perspectives.
Misperception and Crisis Communication
I first describe the effects of perceptual uncertainty on signaling and learning in crisis bargaining. Specifically, this section shows when and how misperception can result in divergent posterior beliefs from the rationalist baseline in equilibrium. While the psychological accounts emphasize that cognitive limitations impede "rational" information-processing and crisis communication, the misperception equilibrium exhibits that this is not always the case. The misperception equilibrium also demonstrates that even though perceptual uncertainty can facilitate information revelation by the sender of a signal under some conditions, it impedes the receiver's learning at the same time. belief, upon perceiving a threat, is strictly less than 1 (i.e., q 1 < 1) for any θ, because his perception can be incorrect with probability (1 − p)(1 − θ) > 0. Likewise, even if D perceives no threat, his posterior belief q 2 is strictly greater than zero (i.e., q 2 > 0), so that he cannot be sure if C really is irresolute because his perception of no threat can be incorrect with probability θ(1 − p).
17 Figure 3 visualizes the extent to which perceptual 17 In the rationalist baseline, the perception of no threat induces q = 0. 
Implication 1 (Signaling and Learning under Perceptual Uncertainty). While misperception facilitates information transmission, it impedes learning.
This implication states that even if perceptual uncertainty allows C to fully reveal her type (when her audience cost is sufficiently high), D is still uncertain about C's "true" type because perceptual uncertainty impedes learning. 
Misperception and Crisis Bargaining
There are many ways in which misperception causes crisis escalation and de-escalation along the equilibrium path that would not otherwise happen in the absence of misperception. As Stein (1990, 58) points out, however, misperception does not always affect the outcome of international crisis. In fact, misperception is inconsequential if D has a pessimistic pre-existing belief, as in the pooling equilibrium, and concedes regardless of her perception of a threat (or the lack thereof).
Implication 2 (Pessimistic Beliefs and Inconsequential Misperception). Misperception is inconsequential if D has a pessimistic belief about C's willingness to use force.
Misperception, therefore, is consequential if D has optimistic prior beliefs. The first type of perceptual error that matters in the misperception equilibrium is optimistic D's failure to perceive a threat when C actually threatens to use force. This type of perceptual error, or false-negative misperception, occurs when optimistic D, which is not resolved to fight because he has relatively low war valuation (w D < −a D ), fails to perceive C's threat and thus revises her beliefs downward, reinforcing her optimistic belief about C's willingness to use force. Figure 3 illustrates this type of perceptual bias as q 2 's deviance from p (i.e., the 45 degrees line) when D is optimistic (i.e., when p <
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The consequence of this overly optimistic belief is that D fails to recognize the risk of an undesired war entailed in the decision to resist (RS 2 ). If the overlooked threat happens to be credible (i.e., if w C ≥ −a C ), a war always ensues from false-negative misperception because D will resist (RS 2 ) with probability one and C will certainly stand firm (SF 1 ) in response along the equilibrium path.
19 If C's audience costs are low (a C < a C ), some of the threats are not credible (as in the semi-separating equilibrium) and war occurs only probabilistically. But if C faces high enough audience costs (i.e., if a C ≥ a C as in the separating equilibrium), the risk of crisis escalation caused by false-negative misperception is acute because it guarantees the outbreak of war. These wars are completely avoidable, because optimistic D would concede (CD 1 ) with probability one and never resist had she correctly perceived a threat. This is possible in equilibrium because D's false-negative misperception lowers her posterior belief about C's resolve, compared to the belief she would form with an accurate perception of the threat.
20
Implication 3 (Misperception and Crisis Escalation). When D is optimistic but not resolved to fight, false-negative misperception causes an avoidable crisis escalation to war if C is politically accountable or resolved to fight, despite the fact that optimistic D prefers concession to war (w D < −a D ).
This unintended crisis escalation to war due to false-negative misperception captures the so-called "defensive avoidance" in the misperception literature: Motivated biases often prevent the receiver from recognizing the risk involved in her decision when the decision involves greater interests, whether political or personal (Janis and Mann 1977) . 21 Lebow (1981) shows that in international conflict the receiver often fails to recognize that she is heading for an undesired war unless she changes her course of action due to the desire to avoid psychologically laden tradeoffs (see also Jervis, Lebow and Stein 1985; Kaufmann 1994; Lebow and Stein 2007) .
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19 Not all the wars in the semi-separating equilibrium are caused by false-negative misperception and hence avoidable, however. Because some overlooked threats are bluffs, D has an incentive to resist (RS 1 ) some of the perceived threats. In such a case, strategic uncertainty alone is responsible for the outbreak of war.
20 That is, D's posterior belief that C is willing to fight is higher when D correctly perceives a threat than when she fails to perceive it, or q 1 > q 2 for θ > 1/2. 
Misperception and War
Psychological accounts of misperception explain wars as "mistakes," arising from perceptual errors. Some authors argue that much or all of the wars involve at least one misperception or that misperception in crisis almost always results in unintended escalation (e.g., Jervis 1988; Lebow 1981) . However, the analysis suggests that misperception is not necessary for war to occur. Several different types of uncertainty cause war along the equilibrium path. The first type of information failure leading to war is strategic uncertainty, where war can occur without misperception with probability π * 1 = p/(1 + a C ). The informational variant of rationalist explanations accounts for this type of uncertainty, where war occurs when D correctly perceives C's threat but mistakenly resists thinking that she is facing the irresolute-type. The semi-separating equilibrium of the rationalist baseline model describes this story (Proposition 1).
The second type of information failure leading to war is perceptual uncertainty, which is described in the "separating" misperception equilibrium. Because C's signal in this equilibrium fully separates her types, war occurs even in the absence of strategic uncertainty. Thus, war occurs with probability π * 2 = p(1 − θ) when D fails to perceive a threat made by the resolute-type and, consequently, mistakenly resists (RS 2 ).
The third type of information failure leading to war involves both perceptual and strategic uncertainty. The "semi-separating" misperception equilibrium describes how these two types of uncertainty are entangled with each other to cause war with probability
). In this case, both strategic uncertainty and perceptual uncertainty contribute to D's optimistic posterior belief that C is unlikely to fight. As a result, there are two equilibrium paths that lead to war: war resulting from strategic uncertainty with probability pθr * and war resulting from perceptual uncertainty with probability p(1 − θ).
The equilibrium analysis has some interesting comparative statics regarding the equilibrium probability of war and the accuracy of perception, θ. On the one hand, the ra- Provided that D is optimistic, more accurate perception increases the risk of war if a C is relatively low (i.e., if a C < a C ). In this case it is the combination of strategic and perceptual uncertainty that causes war. As noted above, two equilibrium paths produce the equilibrium war outcome. The probability of war resulting from strategic uncertainty is increasing in θ (where ∂pθr * ∂θ > 0), while the probability of war resulting from perceptual uncertainty is decreasing in θ (where
). An inspection of these probabilities also shows that pθr * is more sensitive to the change in θ than p(1 − θ). This is because D responds to the accurately perceived threat by quickly increasing her probability of resistance (RS 1 ). These results indicate that perceptual uncertainty actually mitigates the problem of strategic uncertainty by reducing the probability that D gambles. Figure 4 shows this effect with the solid gray curve (i.e., the (a) curve) as a function of the accuracy of perception, θ.
If a C is sufficiently high (i.e., if a C ≥ a C ) and D is optimistic, however, accurate perception reduces the probability of war. This is because signals are fully separating when a C is high, which makes misperception solely responsible for war. Thus, was is less likely as the accuracy of perception improves. Figure 4 shows this effect with the dotted curve (i.e., the (b) curve). Finally, if D is pessimistic and hence the equilibrium pools both C types, then the accuracy of perception θ has no impact on the risk of war. This is illustrated by the solid black (c) curve in Figure 4 .
Alternative Modeling Approaches
A challenge in modeling misperception is that while the psychologists have offered a variety of different interpretations of misperception, it is not feasible to construct a single model that encompasses them all. The analysis so far focuses on a restricted aspect of misperception and its consequence. This section explores two of the most frequently suggested alternative assumptions about misperception.
Audience Costs in the Absence of Challenges
The game depicted in Figure 2 assumes that C does not incur audience costs from backing down if she did not challenge D, even though D resisted nonetheless when he erroneously perceived a challenge. This assumption is in line with the definition of audience costs as signaling costs (Fearon 1994) . However, one could argue that, even in the absence of the initial commitment, C would incur audience costs for backing down. In particular, if D misperceives C's threat when it actually does not exist and then publicly resists, such an act itself may be perceived as a challenge against C, even if D is a status-quo power and defensively minded. In this event, C can suffer diplomatic humiliation by backing down even if there is nothing to back down from.
This modification leads to two changes in the equilibrium. First, the semi-separating equilibrium remains intact except that D's resistance rate increases to one (r * = 1),
as shown in (8) if C incurs no audience cost when she makes no challenge. 25 This implies that the semi-separating equilibrium exists for any a C ≥ 0, while it exists for sufficiently low audience costs a C < 2θ−1 1−θ in the original setup (Proposition 3).
25
The proofs for the claims in this section are provided in Appendix.
The second change is that D's equilibrium strategy changes from (CD 1 , RS 2 ) to (RS 1 , RS 2 ) in the separating equilibrium because the newly added audience costs eliminate D's incentive to concede (CD 1 ) when he perceives a threat. As a result, the net probability of war in equilibrium slightly increases, and this equilibrium exists for any
).
Interpretation of Misperception
The model assumes that although D has limited ability to understand a signal, he nonetheless understands the error structure and optimally uses this knowledge in his decision- in the original equilibrium. An inspection of these optimal rates of resistance reveals that r * modif ied > r * original . This change does not alter the equilibrium behavior or outcome, and comparative statics on these rates remain the same: they are both increasing ( Second, the previous literature does not specify the condition under which misperception matters. My analysis shows that misperception is inconsequential in a crisis if the receiver already believes that the sender is strongly motivated to carry out costly fighting. As the relative capability decreases for the receiver, he becomes more pessimistic about the challenger's intention, so that misperception becomes less likely to plague crisis bargaining.
Third, although the misperception literature suggests that misperception is necessary for war to occur, the analysis here suggests that the relationship between misperception and war is more nuanced. On the one hand, if the challenger faces high audience costs, the receiver's false-negative misperception always results in war that is avoidable. On the other hand, misperception leads to war under more restrictive conditions than previously believed.
Moreover, because the misperception literature predominantly focuses on the pathology of misperception, it fails to consider the possibility that misperception produces peace.
The analysis here shows that misperception facilitates an otherwise unattainable peaceful settlement of a crisis under broader conditions. In particular, as an important implication for the rationalist approach, misperception can alleviate the risk-return tradeoff caused by strategic uncertainty, thereby reducing the probability of war due to incomplete information and misrepresentation incentives.
This article presents a game-theoretic interpretation of how misperception influences crisis bargaining. In doing so, it demonstrates that a rational, game-theoretic analysis can offer more fruitful insights than mere pathology that the psychological literature has presented so far. Yet, the present analysis restricts its attention to a particular type of misperception: perceptual error in receiving the signal. Hence, an obvious next step would be to explore a rationalist logic of other types of misperception such as a non-Bayesian learning process or heterogenous world views held by the decision makers.
Furthermore, the analysis presented in this article necessarily carries a rationalist bent;
after all, the analysis is based on a game-theoretic model. The resulting rationalist logic of misperception demonstrates the possibility that two seemingly contradictory approaches can be fruitfully reconciled and generate some novel insights on crisis communication and the informational origins of war. While collaboration between rationalists and psychologists has begun producing significant advancements across a wide range of issues in political science as well as economics, the study of international conflict has yet to see such a development. Hence, a psychological counterpart to this study would further facilitate the dialogue between the two approaches.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The result follows directly from the preceding discussion in the text, so the proof is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that the payoff from backing down (BD 2 ) for C is 0 if she has retained SQ at the outset of the game and −a C if she challenged (CH). Then the result immediately follows by subgame perfection. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Given lemmas 1 and 2 as well as the discussion in the text, it suffices to show that C cannot profitably deviate from the proposed signaling strategy.
Since D concedes regardless of her perception, both CH and SQ yield the payoff of 1 for both types, implying that no types can profitably deviate from pooling on CH.
Proof of Proposition 3. If D perceives a threat, she resists (RS 1 ) with probability r, which is chosen to make the irresolute-type indifferent between CH and SQ. Since the irresolute type always backs down by subgame perfection (lemma 1), it is indifferent if EU C (CH) =
. Solving for r yields
Note that r * ∈ (0, 1), which implies that 0 <
< 1. For this to be true, both the numerator and denominator must be negative. The denominator is negative if
. The numerator is negative if 1 − θ(2 + a C ) + a C < 0, or
Because a C > 0 by assumption, a C must be positive, which is satisfied if 2θ − 1 > 0, or
, because θ > 0. That r * < 1 also implies that the numerator in (A.1) must be greater than the denominator, which implies a C > 0.
If D perceives no threat, on the other hand, she strictly prefers RS 2 to CD 2 . This implies that q 2 ≤ q * 2 by lemma 2. Substitution yields
. Because θ > Then, for the resolute-type, the signaling strategy is incentive-compatible iff
Because w C < 0, LHS of (A.3) must be strictly negative, which is true if 1 − 2θ < 0, or θ > 1/2. By analogous argument, the signaling strategy is incentive-compatible for the irresolute-type if and only if a C ≥ a C (as is defined in A.2) for θ > 1/2.
To show that D's strategy is indeed a best response, note that by lemma 2 the strat- 
for the proposed separating equilibrium to exist, inequality (A.4)
. Rearrangement gives
The first case is ruled out because of the requirement p < 1. To show that the second case holds, note that p < 1 means 1 > p > However, these two conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously, so (CD 1 , CD 2 ) cannot be part of the separating equilibrium. Finally, consider (RS 1 , CD 2 ). Given this strategy, the separating-signaling strategy is incentive-compatible for C if θ < 
B Supplementary Materials
The materials in this section are not indented for publication. Upon publication, I will make these materials available for the interested readers. I present the formal results of two extensions I discussed in the main text.
B.1 Extension: broader definition of audience costs
The analysis so far assumes that C does not incur audience costs from backing down if she has not challenged D at the outset of the game. However, one could argue that, even in the absence of the initial commitment, C would incur audience costs if she backs down. If, in particular, D publicly resists, misperceiving C's threat when it actually does not exist, such an act itself may be perceived as a challenge against C although D is a status-quo power and defensively minded. In this event, C can be perceived as suffering diplomatic humiliation by backing down even if there is nothing to back down from. This modification leads to two changes in the equilibrium:
1. The semi-separating equilibrium remains intact except for one minor modification: D's optimal resistance rate is now one (r * = 1). This implies that the semiseparating equilibrium does not depend on a C , and it exists for any a C ≥ 0. More specifically, D chooses r to make the irresolute-type indifferent so that EU C (CH) = EU C (SQ), or for any w D < 1.
B.2 Another Extension: Game is forced to end if D fails to perceive a threat
When C makes a challenge but D mistakenly does not perceives this challenge, D may take no further action in response and the game could end. This alternative game structure does not change the result with a minor difference: D's optimal rate of resistance r * in the semi-separating equilibrium is higher in the modified game than in the original game (the pooling and separating equilibria remain unchanged). However, this change does not alter the main result because the comparative statics on the original and modified resistance rate, denoted by (r * modif ied and r * original ) respectively, are both increasing in the accuracy of perception θ and decreasing in C's audience costs a C . make the irresolute-type indifferent between CH and SQ: θ(r(−a C )+(1−r))+(1−θ)·0 = θ · 0 + (1 − θ)(r · 0 + (1 − r) ), or
Note that the upper bound r < 1 requires that the denominator be negative (1 − θ(2 + a C ) < 0; otherwise, r can be greater than 1. The condition 1 − θ(2 + a C ) < 0 is satisfied if θ > 1 2+a C . Because θ < 1, it must be that 1 2+a C < 1, which is satisfied for any a C > 0. Since 1 − θ(2 + a C ) < 0, the numerator must also be negative (i.e., 1 − 2θ < 0) because r > 0. And this is satisfied if θ > 1 2 .
All of this suggests that D is more likely to resist in the modified semiseparating equilibrium than in the semiseparating equilibrium of the original game. That is, r * modif ied > r * original
A comparative statics result shows that both of these r * functions are increasing in θ and decreasing in a C .
